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not only from the lawful claims of third persons having title paramount
to the lessor, and the unlawful entry of the lessor, but also from any
interference by the landlord with the tenant's leasehold rights. Therefore, the giving of the option was an act which the landlord was not
legally bound to do, and hence, a breach of the covenant. It would
then appear that the conclusion of the minority is logical. Public
policy, however, would seem to require the Court's decision.- To hold
otherwise might deter landlords from negotiating with the City and
curtail operation of the statute 20 where a leasehold interest exists.
However, the case should be strictly limited and freely distinguished.

)X
SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE NEW YORK UNIFORM SUPPORT
OF DEPENDENTS LAW HELD CONSTITUTIONAL.-A proceeding was

commenced in California under the California Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act by a mother, resident of California, against her former
husband, resident of New York, to enforce support of their minor
child. The petition was forwarded to the New York Domestic Relations Court. Pursuant to the reciprocity provisions of the New
York Uniform Support of Dependents Law that court ordered respondent to make support payments by depositing specified sums into
court. On appeal, respondent attacked the procedure as unconstitutional. In affirming the order granting support, the Court held that
the procedure did not violate the compact clause, the due process
clause or the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
Landes v. Landes. 1 N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562 (1956).
Prior to the enactment of reciprocal support legislation the remedies available to a dependent where an obligor left the jurisdiction
were cumbersome, expensive, and rarely if ever accomplished the
desired social ends. In the main, criminal liability was ineffective.
Although a husband-father could be prosecuted under certain circumstances,' the result of such a prosecution was merely an added
financial burden upon the state. Often, the cost of extradition
discouraged prosecution. 2
The effectiveness of the civil remedies available to a dependent
was usually limited to those cases where the obligor could be located
20 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE

§ B 15-30.0.
§§ 50, 480.
2 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, ci. 2, provides for extradition of a felon "who
shall flee fron justice!' In many cases an obligor may not have fled from
justice. He may have entered another state to secure employment. See
1N.Y.
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Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act Offers a

Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93, 94 (1951).
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within the jurisdiction. 3 Where the obligor had left the jurisdiction,
the obligee could proceed by an action quasi in rem by sequestering
the property of the obligor located in the state before judgment. 4 In
such cases, however, the decree would, necessarily, be limited to the
value of the sequestered property. Where no property was available,
and the absent obligor had established a new domicile, it was virtually
impossible for a destitute dependent to obtain a support order because
of the inability to acquire personal jurisdiction. Assuming, however,
that a dependent was fortunate enough to obtain personal jurisdiction
prior to the obligor's departure, and a support order was granted
thereon, his condition was not improved to any great extent. Very
often, the dependent lacked the necessary funds to pursue the obligor
into another state. Even if the funds were available the order was
entitled to full faith and credit only as to past accrued amounts. 5
It was against this background that the New York Uniform
Support of Dependents Law was enacted.0 Basically, the law is a
simple two-state procedure enabling a dependent residing in one state
to enforce support obligations against an obligor residing in another7
state without the necessity of acquiring a prior in personam judgment.
Under the statute, a dependent may institute a proceeding in the
county wherein he resides.8 Upon a finding that the responding state
has a substantially similar or reciprocal law,9 the court certifies that
the respondent cannot be served with process within the state and
forwards the petition to the appropriate court of the responding
CHIDREN'S CT. AcT §§ 30-34; N.Y.C. DoM. RE. CT. Acr §§ 91-159.
4 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act §§ 232, 1171-a.
5 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21

3N.Y.

How.) 582 (1858) ; Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 80 (1944) (dictum). Some
state courts, however, have enforced decrees of future support through comity.
See, e.g., Rule v. Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379 (1942) ; Ostrander v.
Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934); McKeel v. McKeel, 185
Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d 746 (1946).
6 Laws of N.Y. 1949, c. 807.
7 "This act shall be construed to furnish an additional or alternative civil
remedy and shall in no way affect or impair any other remedy, civil or criminal,

provided in any other statute and available to the petitioner in relation to the
N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAW § 2118.
same subject matter"
In the case of Morse v. Morse, 3 Misc. 2d 163 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1956), the
plaintiff had obtained a California divorce decree which provided for alimony
of $675 a month. The defendant failed to make payments and the plaintiff
commenced proceedings under the California reciprocal support act. The
Domestic Relations Court ordered the defendant, then a resident of New York,
to make support payments of $400 a month. In the present action the plaintiff
sought a recovery for arrears of $675 monthly up to the time the defendant
began to pay $400 monthly\and for accrued arrears of $275 monthly since then.
The court held, in giving judgment for the plaintiff, that the order of the
Domestic Relations Court awarding $400 a month to the plaintiff was not a
bar to the present action.

8 N.Y.

UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAW

9Id. §2115.

§ 2116 (a).
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state.10 A summons"l issues out of the court of the responding
state.12 If the respondent denies liability, the court of the responding
state sends a transcript of the minutes to the court of the initiating
state, showing the denials entered by the respondent. 13 The court of
the initiating state takes such proof as it deems proper and forwards
a transcript of such proof to the court of the responding state.1 4 Both
parties are granted the right to reply to each other's proof by depositions and to cross-examine witnesses by written interrogatories.15 If
the court of the responding state finds that the petition is supported
by the evidence it will issue an order directing the respondent to make
support payments into court.1 The support payments are forwarded
to the court of thet7initiating state which in turn channels the payments
to the petitioner.
Recognition of the social problem attempted to be remedied by
such legislation has led forty-seven states to adopt the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,18 a law substantially similar to
the New York statute. The novel procedure involved in the operation
of both reciprocal laws has subjected them to constitutional attack.
In Duncan v. Smith 19 the court held that since the act granted the
same privileges to non-residents as it did to residents it does not
violate Article IV, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution. The
procedure affords an opportunity to both the petitioner and the respondent to be heard in open court, and, therefore, does not violate
due process. 2 0 Since proceedings to enforce support have always
21
been cognizable in equity, the right to trial by jury does not apply.
Similarly, since the proceedings are civil rather than criminal in
nature, no right of confrontation exists; 22 notwithstanding the fact
2oId. §2116(c).
11For willfully failing to appear a respondent may be punished in the same
manner for such a violation in any other action. Id. § 2116(j).
121d. § 2116(d).

23Id. §2116(f).
'14 Id. § 2116(g).
25Id. § 2116(i).

16 Id. § 2116(k).
A willful failure to comply with an order is punishable
by contempt. Id. § 2116(m).
17 Id. § 2116 (1), (p).
18 See table, 9A U.L.A. 92 (Supp. 1957). The statutes of Illinois and Iowa
would seem to more closely resemble the New York law. See IL. REv. STAT.
c. 68, §§ 50-59 (1953) ; IOwA CoDe AmN. §§ 252.1-252.9 (1946). Similar legislation is under consideration in the United Nations. See Contini, The United
Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, 31 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 1 (1956).
19262
S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953).
20
Whittlesey v. Bellah, 130 Cal. App. 2d 182, 278 P.2d 511, cert. denied,
350 U.S. 821 (1955); Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App. 2d 154, 270 P.2d 613
(1954) ; Proctor v. Sachner, 143 Conn. 9, 118 A.Zd 621 (1955).
21 Commonwealth ex rel. Warren v. Warren, 204 Md. 467, 105 A.2d 488
(1954).
2
2 Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953) ; Freeman v. Freeman, 226
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that in some jurisdictions the respondent may be required to post a
bond or that he may be put on probation. 23 Furthermore, the civil
nature of the proceeding precludes objection on the ground that the
law is ex post facto in violation of Article I, Section 10, of the
Constitution. 24 The question of whether the law impairs the obligaThe action was
tion of contracts was decided in Smith v. Smith.2
commenced by a divorced wife against her ex-husband for support of
their minor children. In granting an order of support, the court held
that a divorce decree is not that type of contract contemplated by the
Federal Constitution. In addition to the above objections, the compact clause of the Federal Constitution has been offered as an argument against constitutionality. It must be observed, however, that
the reciprocal law bears no aspect of a compact between the 2 6states
since each state is free to repeal or amend the law at any time.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals passed upon the constitutionality of the New York law for the first time; and, in disposing
of the respondent's arguments, the Court adopted the same reasoning
heretofore used in other jurisdictions. That such legislation is not
prohibited by specific constitutional provisions has been pointed out
by decisions in the various cases upholding its validity. The factual
pattern of the present case illustrates the value of reciprocal support
laws, but in a larger sense it demonstrates the propriety of reciprocal
legislation which erases artificial barriers erected by state lines.
Similar legislation in other fields will promote the ends of justice by
eliminating the jurisdictional difficulties raised by a federal form of
government.

ORAL EXTEMPORANEOUS REToRTs LIBEL AND SLANDER Plaintiff brought an
MARKS OVER TELEVISION HELD LIBELOUS. -

action for libel alleging extemporaneous defamatory statements over
defendant-television broadcasting station by defendant-master of ceremonies as to his being deeply in debt. Defendants made a motion to
dismiss contending that a complaint which alleges false oral remarks
does not state a cause of action in libel. The Court in denying the
La. 410, 76 So. 2d 414 (1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Warren v. Warren, 204
Md. 467, 105 A.2d 488 (1954).
23 See Freeman v. Freeman, supra note 22. See also N.Y. UNIFORM SUPPORT
OF DEPENDENTS LAW § 2116(k).
24 Smith v. Smith, 131 Cal. App. 2d 764, 281 P.2d 274 (1955).
-25 131 Cal. App. 2d 764, 281 P.2d 274 (1955).
26 See Duncan v. Smith, supra note 22. See also Brockelbank, Is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act Constitutional?, 31 Opt. L. REv.
7. 98 (1952).

